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INTRODUCTION

Raising funds is a pivotal task for start-up companies. Private
1
equity is crucial for start-up companies, especially in the stages
before they reach profitability. In these stages of a corporation,
other forms of financing, such as debt financing, are rarely
accessible. With neither profits nor tangible assets to serve as
2
collateral, start-up companies are unable to attract creditors.
Private equity has been gaining recognition as entrepreneurial,
small-scale companies have become more central to economic
development in the United States. Studies have shown that during
the last two decades, small firms accounted for the majority of
3
newly created jobs. Additionally, those small firms created the
4
majority of innovations.
Venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide the essential private
equity, but are also active investors of start-up companies. VCs
5
mentor and monitor the companies in which they invest. They
offer assistance and support in developing the business of their
portfolio companies. VCs also have both the access and expertise
needed to conduct effective monitoring.
The distribution of equity, however, is affected by the
requirements and restrictions imposed by the law on issuance and
transfer of securities. As a general rule, absent an exemption, the
law requires companies to register the distribution of securities.
Complying with the registration requirement is not only
exceptionally time-consuming and costly, but also involves public
disclosure of potentially sensitive information. In addition, the

1. Private equity is equity that is not traded on the public markets.
2. See David J. Denis, Entrepreneurial Finance: An Overview of the Issues and
Evidence, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 301, 304 (2004) (“Because [start-ups] are typically not yet
profitable and lack tangible assets, debt financing is usually not an option.”).
3. See, e.g., Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital Formation and Access:
Lingering Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 77, 81 (stating that small businesses “now account for almost all of the new
jobs created”); SBA Office of Advocacy, Small Business Resources for Faculty,
Students, and Researchers: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (March 2004),
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/arsbfaq.pdf (stating that small businesses
“[g]enerate 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually”).
4. See, e.g., Denis, supra note 2, at 301 (“[S]mall firms created more
innovations than their large firm counterparts.”).
5. See, e.g., id. at 305–07 (reviewing the literature on the relationship
between VCs and their portfolio companies); Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and
the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FINANCE 301 (1995) (studying VCs’ monitoring of
their portfolio companies).
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preparation of a registration exposes the key participants to
6
substantial liability.
7
Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933 plays a key role in
facilitating the transfer of securities once the company has become
public. Rule 144 provides a safe harbor for sales of unregistered
shares to the public. It enables certain investors who purchased
shares in a private placement to sell the shares to the public
without requiring the company to file a registration statement. In
practice, it is impossible to sell to the public unregistered shares of
8
public companies without invoking Rule 144. Even if the company
has a contractual obligation to register the investors’ shares when
asked, large investors are likely not to exercise this contractual right
because of the onerous effect on the company.
While Rule 144 enables investors to avoid the costly
registration requirements of the law, it imposes alternative
requirements. There are two key limits to the safe harbor of Rule
9
144: a holding-period restriction and a selling-volume restriction.
Rule 144 imposes a holding period of one year for shares that
10
investors acquired in a private placement. The holding period
11
begins when the shares have been purchased and fully paid. The
selling-volume restriction limits the amount of shares that can be
12
sold following the expiration of the one-year holding period.
Each shareholder can sell shares under Rule 144 only up to an
amount that, when added together with the shareholder’s sales in
the previous three months, will not exceed a certain maximal
13
amount.
This maximal amount is either one percent of the
company’s outstanding shares or the average reported weekly
volume of trading of the company’s securities during the preceding
14
four weeks, whichever is greater.
6. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.6 (5th ed. 2005).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
8. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW SERIES, GOING PUBLIC
HANDBOOK, GOING PUBLIC, THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND EXEMPT
FINANCING 100 (2002).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)–(e).
10. Id. § 230.144(d)(1).
11. Id. In the case of options, the date the option is exercised, rather than
the date the option is granted, marks the beginning of the holding period for the
share issued pursuant to the option.
12. See id. § 230.144(e).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 230.144(e)(1)(i)–(iii).
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Despite the widespread use and importance of Rule 144 in the
business world, there has been little academic legal analysis of it.
The academic legal literature often refers to its restrictions but
mostly only as an example of diverse regulatory practices and not as
15
the main focus of attention.
In 1988, Steinberg and Kempler offered a detailed
examination of the requirements of Rule 144 and expressed
16
concern about the magnitude of its safe harbor requirement.
They argued that Rule 144 is excessively permissive because after a
17
certain holding period it allows non-affiliates to sell restricted
18
19
shares without being subject to the selling-volume restriction.
They reasoned that “the detrimental effect on the capital trading
markets and the investing public are identical, irrespective of
whether one has affiliate status when reselling large quantities of
20
stock.”
This article, in contrast, argues that the selling-volume and
holding-period restrictions should be abolished rather than
extended. It shows that the selling-volume and holding-period
restrictions of Rule 144 are not efficient and do not achieve their
21
Furthermore, it shows that Rule 144 has
anticipated goal.

15. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 335 (1988) (using Rule 144 as an example of the
regulatory use of holding periods to deter exploitive investments); Ellen Taylor,
Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1336
(1997) (using Rule 144 as one example of the redundancy of section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A
Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 307 (2000) (using Rule 144 as an
example of the failure of the securities regulations to protect the unsophisticated
public investors).
16. See Marc I. Steinberg & Joseph P. Kempler, The Application and Effectiveness
of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (1998).
17. An affiliate of an issuer is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2006) as
“a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls,
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.” Id.
18. Restricted shares are shares acquired in unregistered private sales. See id.
§ 230.144(a)(3)(i).
19. See Steinberg & Kempler, supra note 16. The current holding period of
Rule 144, after which non-affiliates are no longer subject to the selling-volume
restriction, is two years starting from the date of purchase of the stock. The
holding period was originally three years until the SEC shortened the duration to
two years in 1997. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145 (February 20,
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7390.txt.
20. See Steinberg & Kempler, supra note 16, at 500.
21. See infra Part II.E.
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22

distorting effects.
Thus, this article presents the opposite
conviction—the selling-volume restriction should not restrict any
shareholder, regardless of whether such shareholder is an affiliate
or non-affiliate. Market forces, rather than statutory restrictions,
are likely to achieve a more efficient outcome that will eliminate
the distorting effects of Rule 144.
Both the holding-period restriction and the selling-volume
restriction impair investor liquidity.
The restrictions force
shareholders to wait one year before they are allowed to sell their
shares, even though a market for their shares may already exist.
And once they are permitted to sell shares, they may do so only to
the extent allowed by the selling-volume restriction.
In this article, I show that the liquidity-reducing effects of Rule
144 distort the financing of start-ups. Rule 144 provides inefficient
incentives and increases the cost of raising capital. This is because
Rule 144 is likely to restrict the amount an investor is willing to
invest in a single company. The selling-volume restriction allows
each restricted shareholder to sell the same amount regardless of
how many shares one owns. Thus, the last share purchased by an
investor bears a much higher liquidity risk than the first share.
After investing a significant amount in a company, an investor
considering purchasing additional shares is unlikely to be able to
rely on Rule 144’s safe harbor for future sale of these shares. Rule
144, therefore, discourages potential investors from investing
substantial amounts in one company.
Thus, Rule 144 provides at least some explanation for a
puzzling empirical finding. Researchers were surprised to learn
that, while VCs’ total investment more than doubled during the
1980s, the average size of their investments increased by only forty
23
percent.
The selling-volume restriction of Rule 144 likely
contributed to the VCs’ inefficient decision to refrain from further
increasing their investment in a single company.
As a result of the selling-volume restriction of Rule 144, the
number of investors a company needs for financing increases. The
number of companies in which an investor invests increases, as

22. See infra Part III.
23. See, e.g., George W. Fenn et al., The Economics of the Private Equity Market, 29
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STAFF STUDIES SERIES NO. 168 (1995),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss168.pdf
(“Somewhat surprisingly, data on investments suggest only moderate shifts toward
larger investments and investments in later-stage new ventures.”).
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well. Generally, it is preferable and more cost-efficient, however, to
have subsequent investment by the same investor. Subsequent
investments lower search and monitoring costs.
Reduction in the amount a company can raise from a single
investor increases transaction and search costs for both the
company and the investors. The investors are likely to look for
multiple potential investments and closely inspect a number of
companies. Reinvesting in the same company, in contrast, would
have required much less inspection, if any. At the same time, the
company has to look for additional potential investors, cooperate
in several due-diligence processes, and coordinate multi-party
negotiation processes, all of which are time-consuming and costly.
Increase in the number of investors that invest in the same
company has a negative effect on the monitoring of the company.
Studies have shown that VCs are uniquely positioned to play an
important role in the governance of their portfolio companies and
24
that the VCs are participating in monitoring activities.
Monitoring a company, however, is a costly activity. And the lower
the stake an investor has in a company, the lower the investor’s
personal benefits are from its own monitoring activities. Thus,
since Rule 144 decreases the amount an investor is willing to invest
in a single company, it is also likely to lead to suboptimal levels of
monitoring.
In addition, Rule 144 can distort the financing decisions of the
company. By causing investors to hesitate to refinance and by
increasing the cost of raising private equity, Rule 144 can force the
company to go public too soon. The choice of delaying public
registration might not be available to the company because Rule
144’s restrictions rendered this choice economically prohibitive.
The company, however, might still be in a stage in which the
benefits of staying private surpass those of going public.
Alternatively, the company might be forced by its investors not
to go public even at a time when going public is the most efficient
strategic choice. Investors are likely to prefer a different means of
exit, such as a merger or an acquisition, to avoid Rule 144’s
restrictions. Rather than go public and become subject to the onsale restrictions of Rule 144, investors looking for liquidity may
even prefer to sell the company at a cost lower than the valuation of

24. See Denis, supra note 2, at 305 (reviewing the literature on the
relationship between VCs and their portfolio companies).
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the company suggests.
Furthermore, Rule 144 influences the company’s choice of
stock exchange on which it will trade once it is public. This
influence occurs because Rule 144 sets the amount that may be
sold under the safe harbor based on the trading volume of the
25
company’s stock.
The different trading methods of the stock
exchanges cause similar transactions to result in different reports of
26
trading volumes. Thus, Rule 144 encourages companies to favor
the stock exchange where higher volume of trading is reported.
Empirical studies found that Rule 144 influences the choice of the
27
stock exchange.
According to these studies, companies often
choose the Nasdaq as the venue for their initial listing. Companies
traded on the Nasdaq often do not transfer their shares to the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) because of Rule 144, despite the
potential increase in share value associated with listing on the more
prestigious NYSE and lower trading costs.
Because of these undesirable effects of Rule 144, I suggest
eliminating both the selling-volume restriction and the holdingperiod restriction. This change will remove the illiquidity costs that
investors incur and will lower the cost of capital for start-ups.
Moreover, both the holding-period restriction and the sellingvolume restriction of Rule 144 undermine the main purpose of the
law—to secure full and fair disclosure and to provide current
information to the public. Artificially limiting the sale of restricted
shares held by sophisticated investors reduces the availability of
information about the firm by camouflaging the value that these
investors assign to the company. If these investors were permitted
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2006).
26. See Kam-Ming Wan, The Effect of Insider Restricted Equity on the Choice of
Exchange: An Empirical Study of the NYSE Listing Choices of NASDAQ Firms, SSRN
ELEC. PAPER COLL. NO. 268010, at 3 (2001) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=268010 (“Nasdaq trading volume typically measures higher than NYSE trading
volume for similar transactions.”); Anne Anderson, Edward Dyl & Laurie Krigman,
Rule 144 and the IPO Exchange Listing Decision 4 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished
working paper, on file with author) (“Nasdaq is a dealer market, whereas the
NYSE is largely an auction market. . . . [T]he reported trading volume for a stock
will be much higher when the stock trades in a dealer market than when it trades
in an auction market.”).
27. See Wan, supra note 26, at 11 (illustrating how “the combination of the
rule 144 and inflated trading volume on the Nasdaq give corporate insiders an
option value to resell more of their company equities when their company is listed
on the Nasdaq instead of on the NYSE”); see also Anderson et. al., supra note 26, at
13 (reporting that “SEC Rule 144 . . . appears to affect the listing decisions of firms
that are going public”).
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to sell, a decision not to sell may indicate that they value the
company at least as much as the price for which it is traded. On
the other hand, a decision to sell, absent liquidity constraints,
would mean that the sophisticated investors believe that the market
overvalues the company.
Furthermore, since the initial public offering (IPO)
registration statement includes a detailed account of the restricted
28
shares purchased prior to the IPO, it should not come as a
surprise if restricted shares enter the market. A sale of such shares
following the completion of the IPO process does not seem to
harm the public, since it should expect such transactions. Thus,
eliminating Rule 144’s restrictions does not compromise the
purposes for which it was promulgated. And the holding-period
restriction may even hurt the retail investors, since the detailed
disclosures of the registration statement and the prospectus
become less accurate with the lapse of time. Therefore, allowing a
sale of restricted shares to take place as early as possible may result
in a more informed purchase transaction than a sale conducted
after one year has elapsed.
If, however, efficiency considerations require investors to limit
the sale of shares purchased prior to the IPO, market forces will
implement such limitations. And the company itself is best suited
to distribute selling rights among its restricted shareholders. Each
company should, therefore, be allowed to determine whether such
sale should be permitted and, if so, under what limitations. This
change will promote an efficient allocation and pricing of selling
rights. Eliminating Rule 144’s restrictions will thus provide a more
efficient investment incentive structure, reduce the disincentive to
invest large amounts in a single company, and lessen the costs of
raising capital.
First, I provide a brief description of the current legal arena,
29
which is the setting for the discussion offered by this article. The
official rationale for Rule 144, along with a discussion of the failure
of Rule 144 to fulfill its intended goals, is also presented. In
particular, this article elaborates on the two requirements of Rule
144 that should be eliminated—the selling-volume restriction and
holding-period restriction. Next, it discusses the distorting effects
30
of those requirements.
Finally, this article questions the
28.
29.
30.

15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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justification for the imposition of any on-sale restrictions following
31
the IPO. It presents the argument for a market-forces regime in
place of the rigid and inefficient selling-volume and holding-period
restrictions of Rule 144. It concludes that the two main restrictions
of Rule 144 should be abolished because of the significant burdens
32
they impose on emerging ventures.
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING
With the growing importance of small firms, private equity’s
fundamental contribution to the economic development is
becoming increasingly evident. Section A of this Part describes the
important role of private equity financing in the development of
small firms and new businesses. This section further describes the
value-added nature of VCs’ investments, which are far from being
limited to the supply of much needed capital.
The remainder of this Part describes certain aspects of the
legal environment that control private financing. Section B
provides a general overview of the securities rules that affect every
equity transaction and focuses on their application to VCs wishing
to sell securities. It also describes the historical background of the
development of these rules. Section C focuses on the safe harbor
of Rule 144. The section provides a description of the salient
features of the selling-volume and holding-period restrictions of
Rule 144, which are especially relevant to private equity financing.
Section D further details the main concerns that Rule 144 was
designed to address. In addition, it describes how Rule 144 chose
to deal with these concerns. Finally, section E discusses the failure
of Rule 144 to achieve its goal. It also shows that Rule 144 is likely
to aggravate some of the problems it was meant to solve and is
likely to create additional problems.
A. Private Equity Financing
Entrepreneurial ventures are faced with the challenging task
of securing funds for their operations. At the early stages, before
they reach profitability or obtain assets that can be used as valuable
collateral, those companies almost exclusively rely on private
equity.

31.
32.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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Studies have found a significant rise in the amount of capital
33
allotted to the private equity market. At the same time, there has
been a rise in the importance of entrepreneurial ventures to
economic development. For the last two decades, small firms have
been responsible for the creation of the majority of new jobs and
34
the majority of innovations.
VCs provide entrepreneurial ventures with crucial capital
needed for the daily operations and growth. Though not the
exclusive source for private equity, VCs are a dominant source of
capital for emerging companies that passed the seed stage (the
35
initial early stage of development).
VCs are also active investors; in addition to providing valuable
capital, they are providing their portfolio companies with added
value. The literature has identified three main types of roles that
36
VCs assume in order to help their portfolio companies. Under
the first role, VCs offer their portfolio companies a range of
support services that assist in building the internal organization of
37
the companies and in marketing the companies’ products. They
are particularly influential in the development of the companies’
business plans. VCs are also well known for being instrumental in
forming strategic alliances.
The second important role that VCs assume is that of
38
As part of their governance activities, the VCs
monitoring.
frequently visit their portfolio companies, often serve on the boards
of such companies, and are involved in shaping the top
management team. The third role of VCs is certifying the quality
39
of the start-ups in which they have invested. The VCs’ reputation
often helps the companies to raise additional funds.
B. The Securities Rules and the Restrictions on Venture Capitalists Selling
33. See, e.g., Denis, supra note 2, at 301–02 (reporting the amounts committed
to venture capital funds in the years 1992–2001).
34. Id. at 301 (describing the importance of small firms to the U.S. economy).
35. Id. at 304 (“[E]ntrepreneurs tend to rely on three primary sources of
outside equity financing: venture capital funds, angel investors, and corporate
investors. . . . [A]ll three sources contribute a substantial amount of capital to
entrepreneurial firms.”).
36. Id. at 305–07 (reviewing the literature on the relationship of VCs and
their portfolio companies).
37. Id. at 306.
38. Id. at 305–06.
39. Id. at 306–07 (reviewing the literature on VCs certifying the quality of
their portfolio companies).
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Securities
The stock market collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression
40
Such
that followed were partially blamed on securities fraud.
fraud included abuse of holding companies, insider trading, and
accounting scandals. This led to the realization that federal
41
legislation was needed. Congress enacted the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act), which is also known as the “Truth in Securities”
42
Act. The 1933 Act intended to provide adequate protection to
investors by disclosing, fully and fairly, all the aspects of the
43
marketed securities.
The 1933 Act is directed primarily at the distribution of
securities, the process by which securities are first offered to the
public. Generally, the 1933 Act requires the registration of all
securities being distributed, either directly by the issuer or
indirectly by an investor in a secondary distribution (i.e., a
distribution of shares previously issued by the company to the
selling shareholders). In the year that followed, Congress enacted
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), which was
44
intended to regulate all aspects of publicly traded securities.
In order to comply with the registration requirement, the
company has to file a registration statement, which is a disclosure
45
document, with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The filing of the registration statement potentially discloses
sensitive confidential information on the company. In addition,
the process of preparing a registration statement is not only
expensive and time consuming, but also exposes the key
participants in the registration to substantial liability for failing to
40. See, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.2; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 251 (1987) (“[The Securities] Act was passed in 1933 . .
. in response to the market crash of 1929. The Act was designed to remedy abuses
in the securities industry, particularly fraud and misrepresentation by securitiesindustry personnel, that had contributed to that disastrous event.”).
41. See, e.g., Paul M. Clikeman, The Greatest Frauds of the (Last) Century, NEW
ACCT., May 2003 (describing the major accounting frauds of the twentieth century,
including the Kreuger & Toll fraud, and noting that such frauds lead to the
enactment of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934), available at http://
www.newaccountantusa.com/newsFeat/wealthManagement/Clikeman_Greatest_
Frauds.pdf.
42. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.2.
43. See id.
44. See id. §§ 1.1–.2; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(2000 & Supp. 2004).
45. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.6.
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comply strictly with the disclosure requirements.
Thus, the
company will prefer to avoid filing a registration statement and will
be reluctant to register the investors’ shares. Furthermore, the
company’s own plans for raising capital might be negatively
affected by a registration of the investors’ previously issued shares.
Absent a contractual right, an investor might not be able to
convince the company to register its shares with the SEC. In the
customary investment agreements, the company grants the
investors a right to force the company to register the investors’
shares. This right, which is called a demand right, is customarily
limited both in how often it can be exercised and in the ability to
exercise. Usually no more than three demand rights are granted,
and only investors that hold a majority of the class shares are
47
allowed to initiate such exercise.
48
In practice, however, demand rights are rarely exercised.
The choice not to exercise these rights is likely to result from both
the high costs that the company would incur from such exercise
and the lack of managerial support for the registration. The
investor, though wishing to sell its shares, is interested in the cost of
such sale to the company. This is because such cost affects the
price the investor can receive for the shares and the value of any
shares it might decide not to sell. In addition, managerial support
49
is important to the success of a registration.
Also, in an
underwritten registration in which numerous shares are sold, as
opposed to a gradual sale of shares to the market, underpricing of
the stock is likely to occur. Thus, even the receipt of a contractual
right to register one’s shares by the company does not render the
registration option a viable one for an investor who wishes to sell its
shares. Despite the fact that the rights to demand registration are
typically not going to be exercised, investors insist on being granted
these rights for a different reason—to obtain future leverage
against the company and not in order to be able to register the

46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to
Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773 (2004) (describing the terms of
a typical VC financing transaction).
48. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age,
2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 151 (1998) (describing the registration rights
in venture capital financing agreements).
49. See 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS, AND REORGANIZATIONS § 9.4, at 195 (2d ed. 1995).
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50

shares in the future.
The 1933 Act provides certain exemptions from its registration
51
52
requirement. The section 4(1) exemption, also known as the
exemption for non-professionals, was designed to facilitate the dayto-day trading transactions between individual investors with
respect to securities already issued, rather than the distribution of
securities. The section 4(1) exemption allows most of the day-today trading between investors on the exchanges and the over-thecounter markets to take place. It provides a registration exemption
for transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
53
dealer. Generally, the 1933 Act defines an underwriter as anyone
who purchases a security from the issuer with a view to distribute
the security (including anyone who indirectly participates
54
therein). One key criterion in determining whether a security was
purchased with a view toward distribution is whether the would-be
underwriter had sufficient investment intent at the time of
55
purchase.
The case law, the SEC’s interpretation of what the Act deems
an underwriter, and the scope of the exemption under section 4(1)
have not provided much practical guidance for the sale of
restricted securities. Each decision as to whether the registration
requirement was triggered required an analysis of all the particular
56
circumstances and was very fact specific. The decisions regarding
those issues were frequently confusing and often appeared
57
inconsistent.
C. Rule 144
In 1972, in order to clear some of the uncertainty, the SEC
58
promulgated Rule 144, which provides some guidance for
50. See Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal
to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 130 (1997)
(“Although there may be practical constraints on the exercise of demand
registration rights, they still may be utilized as leverage over management of the
portfolio company.”).
51. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, §§ 4.1, .21.
52. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2000).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).
55. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, §§ 4.23–.24.
56. See id. at 256 (“The one clear lesson of the cases and SEC decisions is that
section 2(11)’s definition of underwriter is a trap for the careless and unwary.”).
57. Id. § 4.26.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
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answering the question of who is an underwriter and thereby
defines the scope of the statutory exemption under section 4(1).
Rule 144 is not the exclusive method by which restricted securities
may be sold in reliance on an exemption. But reliance on
precedents, rather than on Rule 144, imposes a substantial burden
59
of proof to establish that an exemption is available. In fact, “[t]he
liberality of the rule and the attitudes of the Commission, issuers
and their counsel generally have made sales of restricted securities
of public reporting companies outside of Rule 144 imprudent or
60
impossible.”
Rule 144 provides a safe harbor to investors who purchased
their shares in a transaction not involving a public offering, such as
transactions that occurred prior to the IPO in an unregistered
61
private placement. The safe harbor allows such investors to sell
their shares to the public without registering those shares with the
62
SEC, as required by section 5 of the 1933 Act, subject to certain
63
limitations. The two main limitations are: (1) time restrictions
64
and (2) volume restrictions. Section (d) of Rule 144 allows sales
only following the lapse of a holding period—one year beginning
65
from the date of purchase. Section (e) of Rule 144 allows each
restricted shareholder to sell restricted shares only up to a
66
restricted amount.
This amount of restricted shares, together
with the amount of restricted shares that the shareholder sold
during the preceding three months, shall not exceed the greater of
one percent of the outstanding shares or the average reported
67
weekly volume of trading in the securities during the preceding
68
four calendar weeks.
59. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.26.
60. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at 100.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
62. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
63. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)–(e).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 230.144(d).
66. Id. § 230.144(e).
67. In order for the safe harbor to apply, the class of shares sold must be
listed on a stock exchange or quoted on Nasdaq, not merely traded over the
counter.
68. Id. § 230.144(e)(1)(i)–(iii). It should be noted that shareholders who are
not affiliates of the company may freely sell their restricted shares after the lapse
of another year following the expiration of the one year holding period. Affiliates
are also subject to the one year holding period. Id. § 230.144(d)(1). Affiliates,
however, are always restricted by the volume limitation, even after the lapse of two
years and even if they wish to sell shares acquired in the public market after the
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D. The Official Rationale of Rule 144
The Preliminary Note to Rule 144 describes the concerns that
69
Rule 144 intended to address. The restrictions to the safe harbor
of Rule 144 attempt to resolve three major concerns. First, Rule
144 was designed to implement the purpose of the 1933 Act under
which it was promulgated—to provide full and fair disclosure to the
70
public and prevent fraud in the sale of securities. Thus, Rule 144
was designed to protect investors by preventing the creation of
public markets in securities absent adequate current information
concerning the issuer. In order to achieve this purpose, Rule 144
requires current public information about the company as a
71
condition of the use of the safe harbor. Rule 144(c) states that
the safe harbor is available only if the company complies with the
72
periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.
In addition,
Rule 144(h) requires a shareholder that uses the safe harbor to file
73
a notice with the SEC if the sales exceed a certain threshold. Rule
74
144 allows submitting the notice concurrently with the sale.
Second, the holding-period restriction of Rule 144 was
designed to ensure that the restricted shareholders have personally
assumed the economic risks of their investment at the time they
purchased the shares and are not acting on behalf of the company
75
as its underwriters. This is because the safe harbor under Rule

IPO. Id. § 230.144(k).
69. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
70. Id.
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c).
72. Id. § 230.144(c)(1). Because the availability of the safe harbor is subject
to the company fulfilling its reporting requirements under the 1934 Act,
customary investment agreements include a provision that contractually obligates
the company to comply with all the necessary requirements to allow the investors
to use Rule 144’s safe harbor. See Smith, supra note 50, at 131 (“Registration rights
provisions often state that the portfolio company will make all filings or take other
actions necessary to allow venture capital investors to sell their shares . . . in the
public market pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933.”).
73. Id. § 230.144(h). The threshold for the current filing requirement is a
sale of more than 500 shares or proceeds of an aggregate dollar amount greater
than $10,000 in any three-month period. Id.
74. Id. To be sure, an advance-notice requirement, along the lines of the
proposal by Jesse Fried, to require insiders to disclose their intended trading
shortly beforehand in order to reduce profits from insider trading, would help
achieve a more transparent and efficient securities market. See Jesse Fried,
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1998).
75. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
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144 is intended to exempt transactions between individual investors
from registration and not to exempt sales by the company to the
76
public. Sales by the company to the public, on the other hand,
require full compliance with the registration provisions of the Act
in order to protect the public.
Third, the selling-volume restriction of Rule 144 was designed
to allow only routine trading transactions, as permitted under
77
section 4(1) of the Act, rather than distributions. A distribution is
78
a public offering and usually involves a large amount of securities.
This restriction is concerned with the impact of the transaction on
the market and limits the quantities allowed to be sold, in any given
time, to avoid disrupting the market. Thus, the ceiling set by the
selling-volume restriction is linked to the volume of trading of the
79
stock. The volume of trading of a stock plays an important role in
trading. It is an important role because the ratio of the size of a
transaction to the trading volume is an indicator of the impact the
transaction will have on the price of the stock. The higher the
80
ratio, the greater the price pressure caused by the transaction.
E. The Failure of Rule 144 in Achieving Its Goals
Section D described the objectives of the regulator in
promulgating Rule 144. This section will show that Rule 144 does
not succeed in fulfilling its intended goals. First, while Rule 144 is
intended to promote the availability of information to the public,
the restrictions of the Rule are likely to result in less informed sales.
Second, because Rule 144 ignores the general assumption of
economic risk by private investors, it excessively restricts
76. Excluding from the safe harbor sales by issuers and underwriters is
consistent with the exemption of section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, under which Rule
144 was promulgated. See supra text accompanying note 53.
77. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
78. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.24; see also Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d
1328, 1335 n.6 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that a distribution is “in turn . . .
considered the equivalent of a public offering”).
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1)(ii)–(iii).
80. Microcap companies are companies with low capitalization. Because of
low volumes of trading, “microcap companies” provide an extreme example of the
connection between trading volume and the effect of trade on the price of the
stock. In an SEC guide for investors, the SEC warns the public of the risks of
investing in microcap companies, citing as one of these risks the extreme
sensitivity of the stock price to trading because of the low volume of trading. See
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MICROCAP STOCK: A GUIDE FOR
INVESTORS (2004), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm.
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transactions. Third, whereas Rule 144 attempts to promote market
stability, it fails to contribute efficiently to this goal.
1.

Delayed Sales and Public Information

Contrary to Rule 144’s intent to assure that the public has
current information about the company when it purchases shares,
the restrictions of the rule may negatively affect the information
the public has at the time of the sale. After the selling restrictions
of Rule 144 expire, the public is likely to be less informed than it is
at the time of the IPO (or secondary offering) because substantial
time has passed since the filing of the registration statement. The
detailed disclosures of the registration statement and the
prospectus become less accurate with the lapse of time. Following
the IPO, the press, analysts, and certain sophisticated investors
usually manage to acquire access to some new information about
the company, but such information is limited in scope and accuracy
in comparison to the disclosures that the company is required to
make as part of the registration process. The company is under no
obligation to assist in the exposure of such new information. The
company’s cooperation, however, is likely to be offered to the
underwriters who engage in a due diligence process as part of the
preparation of the registration, since all of the participants
preparing the registration statement, and especially the company,
81
are liable for misstatements or omissions.
Even though Rule 144(c) requires that updated information
about the company will be available, the registration statement
provides more information and is subject to the scrutiny of the
underwriters’ counsels and auditors who perform a due diligence
review of the company. Rule 144(c) requires only that the
82
company comply with the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act,
which are basically periodic disclosure requirements with some
exceptions, such as Form 8-K reporting requirements of
83
extraordinary corporate events.
81. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); see also 1 HAZEN,
supra note 6, § 7.3.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c).
83. In 2002, the SEC expanded the scope of the 8-K filing of material events
of corporate changes and shortened the filing deadline in a move away from a
periodic disclosure regime toward a materiality regime of real-time disclosure
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 409,
Pub.L.107-204 (2002). For the SEC’s rule regarding Additional Form 8-K
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, see 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594
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The periodic reporting is less detailed and subject to less
scrutiny than the registration statement. The periodic reporting is
literally periodic, triggered by the passage of time rather than the
84
occurrence of material events.
Generally, there is no duty to
disclose new information, beyond extraordinary corporate events,
85
between the reports.
In addition, the scope of most of the
periodic reports is limited, and the quarter financial reports are not
86
required to be audited. Thus, allowing a sale of restricted shares
as early as possible and in particular, prior to the expiration of the
holding period, may result in a more informed purchase
transaction than a sale taking place after a year has expired.
Furthermore, before the selling restrictions expire, the
original investors’ sentiments about the value of the stock relative
to the market price are camouflaged. By artificially delaying sales,
Rule 144 impedes the ability of the market price to reflect the
valuations attributed to the stock by the entire market.
Unsophisticated investors are likely to misinterpret the fact that the
original shareholders retain their holdings in the company as a sign
of the original investors’ sentiments about the company, rather
than as a product of a legal restraint. The holding-period
restriction as well as the selling-volume restriction undermine the
main purpose of Rule 144, namely to secure full and fair disclosure
and to provide current information to the public. Artificially
limiting the sale of the restricted shares (by delaying it, as the
holding-period restriction does, or—and this is practically also a
partial delay—by rationing the amount that may be sold at each
given time, as the selling-volume restriction does) is hindering the
availability of information about the real sentiments of the

(Mar. 25, 2004) (“We are adding eight new items to the list of events that require a
company to file a current report on Form 8-K . . . . These amendments . . . shorten
the Form 8-K filing deadline . . . . These amendments are responsive to the ‘real
time issuer disclosure’ provision in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
They are intended to provide investors with better and faster disclosure of
important corporate events.”).
84. See Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure
Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J. L. BUS.
& FIN. 225, 228 (2002) (“Under the federal securities laws, materiality does not
automatically translate into an obligation to disclose information; a duty must
exist. As succinctly put by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, ‘silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.’”).
85. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp.
2004).
86. See id.
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restricted shareholders about the company’s valuation. The
restrictions obstruct the picture of the market valuation of the
company’s shares, and the real decisions of the initial investors
whether to maintain their holdings or dismiss them are not
revealed to the public.
2.

Economic Stake and Length of Investment

Rule 144 intends to provide a safe harbor to sales that do not
involve the issuer. Rule 144, however, restricts investors much
more than is necessary to ensure that the registration requirements
are not circumvented by the issuer. It seems that Rule 144 ignores
the general assumption of economic risks by private placement
investors purchasing their shares before the IPO and that Rule 144
thus excludes from the safe harbor such shareholders unless they
have held the shares for a lengthy time.
No investor can assume with absolute certainty that the
company it invests in will succeed in going public, let alone succeed
shortly after the closing of the investment. A shareholder who
purchases shares before the company goes public assumes the full
risk of the company’s failure to finalize a registration and become
public. Even mezzanine investments, which are venture capital
investments in relatively advanced companies that have passed the
start-up stage, though just barely, and are on the verge of going
public, are risky economic private investments.
Investors that purchased shares in a mezzanine round of
investment, when it seemed that the company was about to go
public and its management was actively planning such a move, did
not always see the company go public. Those investors were often
left with shares of a private company without the ability to realize
profits, or even to sell the shares for any price, for years thereafter.
This was especially the case for investment transactions that closed
shortly before the burst of the technology bubble. Thus, the risk
associated with participating in a private placement transaction is
so significant that it seems unnecessary to add another deterrent,
such as a holding-period restriction, merely because of the concern
that the investor, without assuming the economic risks of its
investment, might be a “conduit[] for sale to the public of
unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an
87
issuer.”
87.

Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
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The concern of Rule 144 with restricted shares that were
acquired prior to the IPO becomes irrelevant after the filing of the
IPO registration statement. The registration statement has to
include a detailed account of the restricted shares and the rights
88
attached thereto. The filing requirements associated with going
public are intended to inform the public and, in a sense, rectify
and redeem those previously acquired shares for the purpose of the
1933 Act. A resale transaction by a private investor that acquired its
shares prior to the IPO is not similar to a transaction in which
securities are issued by the company itself following the IPO. The
latter involves a change in the capital structure of the company and
a decision to raise more funds by the company, while the former
does not.
Following the IPO, a sale of shares purchased prior to the IPO
should not be viewed as a distribution within the meaning of the
1933 Act. This should be the case even if the shares were
purchased as a mezzanine investment, and even with the intent to
sell such shares in the future, as long as it is done in the manner
specified under Rule 144. The Rule imposes sufficient conditions
for the application of the safe harbor without the need for the
onerous holding-period and selling-volume restrictions. Indeed,
Rule 144(f) imposes a manner-of-sale condition that prohibits
solicitation of orders to buy and requires the use of a broker or a
89
market maker for the sale. The payment to such broker cannot
exceed the usual and customary broker’s commission. Rule 144(c)
also adds a current public information requirement that permits
sales, subject to the other requirements of Rule 144, only if the
company has complied with the periodic reporting requirements
90
under the 1934 Act.
Chronologically, there are two types of transactions: (1) private
placements occurring prior to the actual IPO; and (2) issuances
not involving any public offerings that take place following the
91
IPO. One might want to distinguish between securities purchased
in a private placement before the IPO and those purchased after
the IPO. With regard to issuances preceding the IPO, the fact that
the registration statement must include a detailed description of
such issuances should be enough. When it comes to issuances
88.
89.
90.
91.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f).
Id. § 230.144(c).
See id. § 230.144(a)(3).
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following the IPO, there seems to be a more justified concern
about the issuer trying to avoid an additional registration by using
exempt private placements with the intent that public resale will
soon follow. In such an event, if the new shareholders are able to
resell their shares in the market easily, the company might be able
to circumvent the requirements associated with another public
92
offering. However, the “manner of sale” condition of Rule 144
93
and the current-information requirement, along with the Form
94
8-K reporting requirements, seem to ease the concern especially
regarding the former type of transactions.
3.

Market Stabilization and Limitation on Sales

The restrictions of Rule 144 do not contribute effectively to
the stabilization of the market and prevention of extreme price
fluctuations. The restrictive effect of Rule 144 on the volume of
trading of the company varies with the number of restricted
shareholders that the company has. The selling-volume restriction
is not sensitive to the effect of the aggregate sales by all the
restricted shareholders on the trading volume of the company.
Thus, Rule 144 does not effectively control the aggregate increase
in the volume of trading because it only limits sales by each
95
individual shareholder and ignores the number of shareholders.
Furthermore, in spite of the sale restrictions of Rule 144,
underwriters find it necessary to administer lock-up agreements
that contractually limit the sale of stock acquired before the IPO
96
for the purpose of stabilizing the market. The ubiquity of lock-up
agreements indicates that Rule 144 fails to stabilize the market.
The underwriters’ lock-ups are different from Rule 144’s
requirements both in the length of time during which the sale is
restricted and in the amount of shares that are restricted. This
97
suggests that while stabilizing the market is desired, it can be
92. Id. § 230.144(b).
93. Id. § 230.144(c).
94. Id.
95. For a numerical example, illustrating the selling-volume restriction’s
ineptitude to prevent significant volume increases following sales of restricted
stock, see infra Part III.C.
96. See SEC, Initial Public Offerings, Lockup Agreements, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/lockup.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (describing the typical lock-up
agreement).
97. Stabilizing the market is especially important in the immediate period
that follows the IPO. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 6.1.
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achieved by the market without external intervention. Rule 144’s
attempt to stabilize the market is thus redundant at best.
Comparing the requirements of Rule 144 and the customary lockup agreements suggests that Rule 144 is excessively restrictive
because it imposes a holding period that in some cases may last
98
longer than the customary lock-up period of six months.
Not only does Rule 144 fail to achieve its intended purpose, as
this Part shows, its restrictions have additional negative effects.
Such effects, which will be described in the next section of this
article, include increases in the cost of raising capital and
inefficient investment incentives.
III. DISTORTIONS CAUSED BY RULE 144
Rule 144, in its current form, induces inefficient behavior and
provides the wrong incentives. To be sure, Rule 144 is harmful to
investors that hold restricted shares because such investors are
directly restricted by it. Rule 144 adversely affects the public
because they may be less informed when purchasing the company’s
99
shares. The company is also hurt because Rule 144 makes it more
difficult for the company to raise capital. The discussion in this
Part will focus on Rule 144’s effects on the company.
Section A of this Part describes the increase in the cost of
capital incurred by emerging companies because of Rule 144. The
cost increase is a direct result of the restrictions on the investors’
ability to liquidate their investment. Section B discusses the effect
of the reduced liquidity on the ability of the VCs to finance
investments in inefficient capital markets. The reduction in
available funds hurts the ability of emerging ventures to receive
financing from VCs. Section C presents the problem of suboptimal
investment that Rule 144 creates. It also describes the pressure not
to invest significant amounts in a single start-up. The section
further describes the costs that are generated because of the
inefficiently low levels of investments that each VC is willing to
invest in a single start-up. Such costs include higher search costs,
higher investigation costs, reduced monitoring, and the increased
risk of conflicts of interests. Section D describes the negative
98. The underwriters’ six month lock-up period starts at the IPO. The Rule
144 holding period, on the other hand, starts at the time the stock is originally
purchased. Thus, the effective length of Rule 144 restriction on sale as of the IPO
depends on the time of purchase.
99. See supra Part II.E.1.
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effects of Rule 144 on the financing decision of the company. The
Section shows how Rule 144 is likely to play a pivotal role in the
company’s decision of when and where to go public.
A. Increase in the Cost of Capital
The ability of a shareholder to sell securities freely is valuable.
100
The investor faces the risk
The market views illiquidity as a cost.
that, should it be in need of funds while its investments are illiquid,
it will be forced to bear borrowing costs or lose a promising new
investment. In addition, illiquidity exposes the shareholder to the
risk of losing the value of its investment. Reducing a VC’s liquidity
increases its risk-bearing costs. It is faced with the risk that the
value of its shares will fall, yet it will be prevented from divesting its
investment and from diversifying the risk by lowering the amount
of such shares in its portfolio. In effect, the VC will be forced to
choose different venues to mitigate the risk. VCs are particularly
sensitive to liquidity since they are expected to convert their
investments into cash or marketable securities after a relatively
101
short time.
The restrictions of Rule 144, however, impede the liquidity of
the holders of restricted securities. Such holders are artificially
forced to wait before they are allowed to sell their shares, even
though a market for their shares already exists. The holdingperiod restriction renders the restricted shares completely illiquid
for the duration of the holding period.
The extent of the liquidity that is permitted by the sellingvolume restriction is basically determined by two factors. The first
102
factor is the volume of trading of the company’s shares —a
variable over which the shareholder has no direct control and
100. See, e.g., David Goldreich et al., The Price of Future Liquidity: Time-Varying
Liquidity in the U.S. Treasury Market, 9 REV. FIN. 1 (2005) (finding that the value of
securities depends on their expected liquidity); Viral V. Acharya & Lasse H.
Pedersen, Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 375 (2005) (showing that
the securities’ price depends on the liquidity risk of the securities).
101. See, e.g., Fenn et al., supra note 23, at 29 (studying the private equity
markets and describing the VCs’ investing behavior); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 345 (2005) (“Exit is not merely
optional for venture capitalists. Most venture capital funds have a fixed life . . . .
Any venture capitalist who desires to remain in business, therefore, must
successfully raise funds, invest them in portfolio companies, then exit the
companies and return the proceeds to the fund investors . . . .”).
102. For a description of Rule 144(e)’s volume restriction, see supra notes
66–68 and accompanying text.
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which often cannot be accurately predicted. The other factor is the
number of shares held by such shareholder. The liquidity of the
shareholder is positively correlated with the first factor—the
volume of trading—and negatively correlated with the latter
factor—the number of shares the shareholder owns. As long as the
volume of trading is not exceptionally high and the holdings of the
shareholder are not extremely small, the selling-volume restriction
is responsible for the partial illiquidity of the shareholder.
As described below, in addition to liquidity constraints, the
investors incur further costs as a result of Rule 144. All of the
investing costs that the investors incur are taken into account when
they negotiate with the start-up.
In order to compensate
themselves, the investors shift at least part of the excessive cost to
the company and increase the return they demand from it. This
raises the cost of capital with which start-ups have available. Thus, a
start-up that wishes to raise capital is faced with more obstacles.
The start-up is forced by the investors to bear the higher costs that
the restrictions of Rule 144 generate. Hence, the increased cost of
capital makes it more expensive and difficult for start-ups to receive
financing.
B. Reduction in Resources Available to Emerging Ventures
Reducing the liquidity of investors locks their resources in a
mature investment while hindering their ability to support an
alternative new investment in imperfect capital markets. It would
be more efficient, though, if the investors that are less risk averse
and more capable of assessing the risk supported the new
investment while the public invests in the mature investment. This
is especially relevant to resources of investors like VCs that support
emerging start-ups in their initial steps. In these initial stages, it is
too risky for the unsophisticated public to invest because it lacks
the needed expertise. Due to market inefficiency, VCs might not
be able to raise enough funds from institutions to allow them to
invest at an optimal level. Restricting the ability to liquidate VCs’
investments once the companies are public is likely to further
reduce the availability of funds for new investments. Thus, one of
the outcomes of Rule 144 is that fewer resources are available for
emerging ventures.
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C. Suboptimal Investment
Rule 144 discourages investors from acquiring large amounts
of a single company. Investors are likely to prefer to invest smaller
amounts in more companies, rather than larger amounts in fewer
companies. This is because the liquidation rights granted under
Rule 144’s safe harbor are disproportionate to the amount of
restricted shares a shareholder has.
The formula to calculate the maximum amount of restricted
shares a shareholder may sell under Rule 144 does not take into
account how many shares the shareholder owns. Rule 144 does not
distinguish among shareholders; it states the maximum allowed
amount per shareholder without taking into account the size of its
holdings, the number of other holders of restricted shares or the
103
aggregate amount of restricted shares.
Since Rule 144 allows
each shareholder to sell up to the same maximum amount, one
shareholder may liquidate one hundred percent of its holdings
while a bigger shareholder may only liquidate a small fraction of its
holdings.
In contrast, customary contractual arrangements that are in
effect prior to the IPO link rights of shareholders to their
percentage holdings (e.g. participation in first refusal rights—the
right to participate in future issuances of the company and in cosale rights—the right to participate in a sale transaction by certain
104
shareholders).
Market behavior in similar circumstances
indicates an efficient contractual arrangement.
Rule 144 links the right to sell with the shareholder rather
than with the share. Each restricted shareholder is allowed to sell
105
the same amount regardless of the size of its holdings. Thus, the
last share purchased is accompanied by a much higher risk of
illiquidity than the first. After a certain amount of investment, the
shareholder knows that he or she will not be able to use the safe
harbor of Rule 144 for selling any of the new shares that it
purchases.
Consider the following example. To illustrate the effect of
Rule 144, let us look at two hypothetical companies: Company A
and Company B. Company A has one restricted shareholder who
103. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(2).
104. To be sure, other contractual arrangements that are not strictly financial,
such as veto rights and rights to nominate directors, often are not proportionate
to the shareholders’ percentage holdings.
105. Id.
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has 100 restricted shares.
Company B has ten restricted
shareholders owning ten restricted shares each. Other than that,
the two companies are similar in all respects. Assume that the
average weekly trading volume for the last four weeks was ten
shares for both companies. Let us further assume that all of the
restricted shareholders of both companies are eager to liquidate
their respective holdings.
The single restricted shareholder of Company A will sell ten
shares in the market, increasing the volume of traded shares by ten.
At the same time, the ten restricted shareholders of Company B will
each sell ten shares, accumulating to a total of 100 shares. We can
see that Company B will experience an increase in the volume of
trading of 100 shares, as opposed to only a ten shares increase in
the volume of trading of Company A. This result shows the
weakness of Rule 144 in stabilizing the market; it does not
effectively control the increase in the trading volume. Thus, Rule
144 does not effectively prevent excessive price pressure and
106
market disruption.
Company

No. of
Rest.
Shldrs.

Shares
per
Shldr.

A

1

100

Total
Rest.
Shares

100
(1x100)
B
10
10
100
(10x10)
Rest. = restricted; Shldr. = shareholder

Rule 144
Sale Limit
per Rest.
Shldr.
10
10

Total
Shares
Sold
10
(1x10)
100
(10x10)

Furthermore, as we can see from our example, Company B’s
restricted shareholders were able to liquidate all of their restricted
holdings, while Company A’s restricted shareholder was only able
to liquidate a fraction of her restricted holdings—only ten percent.
If she had diversified her investment and partially invested in
Company B instead of continuing her support of Company A, she
would have increased her liquidity. Had she invested, for example,
in ten similar companies, buying ten shares in each, instead of just
focusing on Company A, she would have enjoyed full liquidity.
Rule 144, therefore, has the effect of restricting the amount an
106.

See supra Part II.E.3.
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investor is willing to invest in one company, though it might be
preferable and more cost-efficient to have subsequent investments
by this same investor. This effect of Rule 144 can provide at least a
partial explanation of the empirical findings that have puzzled
researchers. According to these findings, while venture capital
more than doubled during the 1980s, the average size of
investment increased by only forty percent during the same period,
in spite of the market-wide acknowledgement that efficiency
requires an increase in the size of investments more than the
107
increase in the number of investments.
It may be more efficient to have follow-on investments by the
same investor, and it is, therefore, inefficient to limit the amount of
shares an investor can sell under the safe harbor in the manner
that Rule 144 does. The costs of smaller-than-desirable investments
in start-ups may involve: (1) additional searching costs by both the
investors and the start-ups; (2) excessive due diligence costs;
(3) suboptimal monitoring; and (4) increased conflicts of interest
between investors and start-ups.
1.

Higher Search Costs

Since Rule 144 has the effect of reducing the amount an
investor is willing to invest in a single company, it is not enough to
find a single promising venture in which to invest and reinvest.
The investors incur additional search costs because they have to
continue to look for additional investments.
Similarly, the
company has to look for more investors. Because one investor may
not be willing to fund the company sufficiently, the company has to
look for and deal with more than one potential investor. This
increases the search costs of the company and the company’s cost
of capital.
2.

Higher Investigation Costs

After an investor finds a company to invest in, it conducts
detailed due diligence before finalizing the investment. Unlike
new investors, existing investors do not need to conduct costly,
107. See Fenn et al., supra note 23, at 14 (“Many market participants suggest
that as the size of partnerships increases, increasing the average size of investments
is more efficient than increasing the number of investments . . . . Somewhat
surprisingly, data on investments suggest only moderate shifts toward larger
investments . . . .”).
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extensive due diligence on the company. The existing investors
already conducted such expensive research at the time they first
invested in the company. The existing investors are already
shareholders of the company and often have board representation.
Thus, they are kept informed of any material changes that take
place since the original investment and are considerably familiar
with the company. The review of the company that they will
require before reinvesting, if any, will be more focused and less
expensive. Because Rule 144 has the effect of increasing the
number of new investors rather than reinvestments, it increases due
diligence expenses that could have been prevented if existing
investors reinvested.
3.

Reduced Monitoring

The preinvestment screening process and the structure of the
financial contracts provide VCs with unique access to information
that facilitates monitoring. The monitoring activities themselves,
108
however, are costly.
The alignment of interests of the company with those of an
individual shareholder declines with the decrease in percentage
holdings of the latter. The lower the stake of an investor in the
company, the lower the investor’s incentive to monitor the
operation of the company’s management. An investor that invests
less in a company internalizes less of the benefits of its own
monitoring of the company. Hence, Rule 144 might lead to less
monitoring than is optimally desired.
4.

Increased Risk of Conflict of Interests

The risk of a conflict of interest between an investor and one
of its portfolio companies caused by a potential conflict between
two portfolio companies increases with the addition of more
portfolio companies in which an investor is invested. The investor
might inefficiently favor one company in place of the other because
it is invested more in the former.
This misalignment of interests between the company and the
investor, aggravated by the increase in the number of ventures
backed by the same investor, may provide the investor with
incentives to steer the company toward an inefficient result. To be
108. See Denis, supra note 2, at 305 (reviewing the literature on VCs’
monitoring activities and the effects of the associated costs).
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sure, such behavior will be done in a subtle way, without raising the
suspicion of the management of the company that is unaware of
any specific conflicting interests. The special role that VCs play in
109
the emerging venture’s business, as described above, allows the
VCs to influence the company opportunistically without raising
doubts as to their hidden intentions.
D. Distortion of the Company’s Financing Decisions
A private company, looking to finance its operations, can try to
do so in several ways. It is likely to raise money in private financing
transactions, in a public offer, or in a merger and acquisition deal
(M&A). The decision how to finance the operations is likely to be
influenced by Rule 144, resulting in a less efficient choice. This
Section describes how, because of Rule 144, a company may
110
inefficiently decide to refrain from or delay going public and it
111
may, under certain circumstances, go public prematurely.
Furthermore, it may choose to be traded on a specific stock
exchange because of Rule 144’s restrictions, not because of the
112
merits of the exchange.
1.

Delay in Going Public

Even though it may be more efficient, the company might
postpone or decide against going public because of investor
pressure. The investors may ask the company to find a different
means of financing that provides easier liquidity prospects for the
investors, such as M&A, which does not rely on Rule 144’s safe
harbor. Liquidity is especially important to VCs that structure their
113
investment fund as a short-term investment vehicle. Accordingly,
in the case of a start-up by the name of PowerDsine, it was reported
that investors preferred a sale of their portfolio company to an IPO,
even though the value of the company for the purposes of an IPO
was about twenty-five percent higher than the valuation of the
114
company that was negotiated for the purposes of a sale.
Thus,
109. See supra Part II.A.
110. See infra Part III.D.1.
111. See infra Part III.D.2.
112. See infra Part III.D.3.
113. See Smith, supra note 101, at 316 (“The ability to control exit is crucial to
the venture capitalist’s business model of short-term funding of nascent business
opportunities.”).
114. See Sophie Shulman, PowerDsine Keeps Silent on Talk of Sale, HAARETZ.COM,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 9
6. GANOR - RC.DOC

1476

4/22/2007 7:14:52 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

the liquidity constraints of a shareholder of a publicly traded
company, aggravated by Rule 144 restrictions on sale, may motivate
investors to prefer lower-value transactions over higher-value
transactions and may influence the company not to go public.
2.

Going Public Too Soon

The company might alternately be forced to go public too
soon because the alternative private placement has become too
expensive. In general, the increase in the cost of private equity,
due to the liquidity constraints imposed on investors by Rule 144,
makes it harder for the company to find investors. Furthermore,
the old investors of the company might be reluctant to reinvest
after having reached a certain level of investment because of the
115
selling-volume restriction of Rule 144.
After failing to secure
private financing at an affordable price, the company is likely to
turn to the public option.
Even though there are benefits from becoming a public
company, the process involves notable costs and risks. The
preparation of the registration statement by itself is a demanding
task. Once the company is registered, it is exposed to additional
risks and costs, such as those required to comply with the
mandatory periodic reporting. The preparation of such reports is
expensive, consumes management time, exposes those involved to
liability, and divulges information that a private company may keep
confidential. In addition, a public company is more likely to be
pressured to show quick returns, rather than focus on the longterm performance of the company.

Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jht
ml?itemNo=403941.
PowerDsine is engaged in talks concerning the sale of the company . . . .
[T]he negotiations are centering on a company value of $170–200
million . . . . While the company talks of a sale, it is also in the process of
an IPO on the Nasdaq according to a value of $250 million before the
money. The company aims to raise $70–80 million . . . . In the event that
PowerDsine reaches an agreement with the potential . . . buyer, company
shareholders are expected to opt for the sale rather than the stock issue.
While the sale would allow the shareholders to immediately realize their
holdings, the public issue comes with a risk of a drop in the value of their
investment.
Id.
115. See supra Part III.C.
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Inefficient Choice of Stock Exchange

Empirical studies have found that the selling-volume
restriction of Rule 144 is an important factor that influences the
choice of stock exchange and often results in an inefficient choice
116
for the traded company.
Because of Rule 144, companies often
117
choose the Nasdaq as the venue for their initial listing, and
companies traded on the Nasdaq often do not transfer their shares
to the NYSE. This is due to the difference in measuring trading
volumes. On the Nasdaq, a transaction may result in a reported
volume of twice the size, compared to the reported volume of a
similar transaction on the NYSE because of the different methods
118
of trading.
Despite the potential increase in share value
119
associated with listing on the more prestigious NYSE, and lower
120
trading costs, companies with investors that intend to sell a large
121
number of restricted shares following the IPO, such as VCs, tend
122
to prefer to register on the Nasdaq.
As a rough estimate for some of the costs borne by
shareholders and indirectly caused by Rule 144, one can look at the
excessive costs incurred as a result of trading on the Nasdaq rather
than trading on the NYSE. The aggregate cost inflicted by Rule
144’s restrictions is at least as high as the cost of the measures taken
by the shareholders in order to avoid the restrictions of the Rule.
Huang and Stoll calculated the excessive cost of transacting on
116. See Wan, supra note 26, at 39; see also Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 9
(“The IPO listing decision is strongly related to subsequent Rule 144 selling
activity.”).
117. See Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 13 (“Many firms that are eligible for
listing on the NYSE choose, instead, to have their shares traded on Nasdaq.”).
118. On the Nasdaq, dealers often take position (buy/sell) as opposed to
merely acting as an agent who matches and completes the transaction. The result
is a doubling of the reported volume for a similar transaction. See Wan, supra note
26, at 14; Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 4.
119. See Wan, supra note 26, at 8 (“[C]ompanies usually perceive listing on the
NYSE is prestigious and can enhance their firm visibility.”); Anderson et al., supra
note 26, at 2 (“Numerous studies suggest that firms benefit from being listed on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).”).
120. See Wan, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he bid-ask spread for Nasdaq-listed
stocks is larger than comparable NYSE-listed stocks. This implies that stocks of
companies that . . . list on the Nasdaq bear larger transaction costs . . . .”).
121. See Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 11 (“[T]he presence of venture
capital backing of the IPO firm significantly increases both the number of sellers
of restricted shares and the amount of such selling after the IPO.”).
122. Id. at 9 (“IPO firms that choose to list on the NYSE have significantly
fewer insiders disposing of restricted shares in the two years following the IPO,
and insiders in NYSE IPOs sell significantly fewer restricted shares overall.”).
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123

the Nasdaq rather than on the NYSE in 1991.
They found a
difference of 10.8 cents per share in the “effective” bid-ask
124
125
spreads.
This number can be used as a conservative measure
for the calculation of the higher costs that investors chose to incur
in order to circumvent some of the restrictions of Rule 144. The
corresponding average monthly trading volume per company
traded on the Nasdaq is 3,681,500 shares, as calculated by Huang
and Stoll, using a sample comprised of the largest Nasdaq stock
126
matched to NYSE stock.
Multiplying the difference in the
effective spreads by an estimate of the yearly volume of trading of a
127
hypothetical company traded on the Nasdaq results in a yearly
estimated total loss of about $5 million. Capitalizing the excessive
yearly costs over the entire life of the firm, assuming no future
switch to the competing exchange and no change in the difference
between the exchanges, provides the estimated lifetime loss by the
shareholders of a company traded on the Nasdaq, rather than on
128
the NYSE, to be about $60 million.
While this shows another important inefficient behavior that is
a direct result of Rule 144, it must be noted that this result can be
fixed in a relatively easy manner. To fix this specific distortion, it is
enough that the method by which the volume of trading is
measured for the calculation required by Rule 144 will be regulated
so that the choice of stock exchange will no longer affect the
selling rights under the Rule, and this does not call for abolishing
the restriction altogether. But this empirical result shows the
extent to which shareholders will go to avoid Rule 144’s restrictions
and indicates the significance of the sale restrictions and the need
to consider the other distortions that it may cause.

123. See Roger D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, Dealer Versus Auction Markets: A Paired
Comparison of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 313 (1996).
124. Id. at 325. “The cost of executing transactions is higher on Nasdaq than
on the NYSE by every measure we calculate.” Id. at 351. “The contrast between
the two markets is quite striking. In each trade size category, the quoted spread
on Nasdaq is nearly twice the quoted spread on the NYSE.” Id. at 324.
125. Id. at 324–25.
126. Id. Table 1 at 321.
127. (10.8 ÷ 100) × $3,681,500 × 12 = $4,771,224.
128. ($4,771,224 ÷ 0.0814) = $58,614,545. The 8.14 discount rate used for the
capitalization is the long term interest rate in effect at the date of the data used for
the empirical findings. Huang & Stoll, supra note 123. The rate used is the 1991
thirty-year treasury constant maturity rate as reported by the Federal Reserve; these
rates are available on the Federal Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_TCMNOM_Y30.txt.
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IV. TOWARD A MARKET FORCES DRIVEN REGIME
This Part discusses the possibility of replacing the restrictions
of Rule 144 with a market forces driven regime in which each
company can decide whether to restrict the re-sale of pre-IPO
acquired shares and the extent of such sale restriction. Such a
regime would be more efficient and would eliminate the distortions
that are caused by the restrictions of Rule 144. This Part further
considers the possibility that a policy prohibiting any restriction on
re-sales serves the interests of the public.
Currently, underwriters contractually prevent sales by
shareholders who purchased their shares prior to the IPO usually
129
for a period of 180 days following the IPO.
This contractual
mechanism, aimed at stabilizing the market, is known as
underwriters’ lock-up. At the time of their investment, investors
undertake to be bound by such lock-ups, should the underwriters
deem it advisable for the success of the company’s IPO.
The one-year holding period of Rule 144 might restrict sales
for a longer time after the IPO than the customary 180-day lock-up
period beginning at the IPO and administered by underwriters.
Since Rule 144’s holding period starts from the original purchase
date, the selling restriction following the IPO depends on how
much time has lapsed between the original purchase date of the
shares and the IPO. The holding-period restriction of Rule 144
might be unnecessary or even inefficient for the purpose of
stabilizing the market because it may restrict sales after the IPO for
130
longer than the 180 days of the underwriters’ lock-ups.
If a
longer period of sale restriction is needed in order to stabilize the
market for the company’s shares, an efficient market will
contractually administer such longer restriction because
underwriters would have demanded it as part of their attempt to
stabilize the market to ensure the success of the public registration
of the company’s shares. If an economic justification to restrict the
129. See SEC, supra note 96.
130. The time period of at least one year seems inconsistent and excessive in
comparison with the mere six-month period of Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 that fends off abuse of inside information in short-swing
transactions. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2000 &
Supp. 2004). Both of these periods—the six months of Section 16 and the one
year of Rule 144—may be arbitrary. A six-month period, however, seems to have a
market validation as an efficient period for stabilizing the market and preventing
insiders from trading because it is the customary period contractually enforced by
underwriters as a lock-up period.
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sale of shares following the initial public offering existed, as the
131
one stated in the SEC’s preliminary note to Rule 144, such
restrictions would have been contractually agreed upon and
enforced, driven by market forces similar to those behind the
administration of the underwriters’ lock-up.
Moreover, contractual restrictions have the advantage of being
specifically tailored to fit the different needs of each company.
Each company may require a different restriction in order to create
and stabilize a public market for its shares. Such a restriction
should be more flexible and take into account, inter alia, each
company’s specific capital structure, size, and various accounting,
business, and reputational characteristics.
For example,
significantly promising companies may not need any sale
restrictions in order to stabilize the market for their shares. The
shareholders of such companies should be allowed to resell their
shares freely. On the other hand, companies that are more
susceptible to price fluctuations can restrict their shareholders
contractually, similarly to the underwriters’ lock-ups. Unlike the
Rule 144 selling-volume restriction, the contractually administrated
restrictions on resales will be sensitive to the number of restricted
shares and the total effect of such sales.
The companyadministrated resale rights can also discriminate shareholders
based on the importance each shareholder assigns to liquidity, and
the company can grant the re-sale rights efficiently, based on the
price each shareholder is willing to pay for liquidity.
A company-initiated lock-up, such as the underwriters’ lockups, is likely to be more efficient than Rule 144’s restrictions, as
previously explained. It may be, however, that a market free of any
temporary artificial limitations on the supply of shares is preferable.
Indeed, the administration of a lock-up period following an IPO is
a deeply rooted custom in the going-public practice. The fact that
it is the underwriters’ custom, by itself, however, cannot provide a
justification for its existence. Other underwriters’ practices, such as
the custom of under-pricing the offer of “hot” IPOs for the benefit
of selected friends who are granted privileged access to lucrative
public placements, have been challenged and their legality
132
questioned.
131. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
132. See Matt Marshall, Opening Up the IPO to Smaller Investors: Concept Catching
the Interest of Bay Area Tech Companies, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003, at 1E
(“Ritter, the University of Florida professor . . . says . . . there’s no good
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The interaction between the two underwriters’ practices—the
under-pricing practice, which is known as “spinning” or as “the
friends of Frank,” and the lock-ups practice—may shed a different
light on the use of the underwriters’ lock-ups. The lock-ups may
well be instrumental in enabling those who were granted privileged
access to the underpriced IPOs to realize quick gains before more
shares are entered into the market. Thus, it seems that these
underwriters’ lock-ups are, in fact, driven by private dealing.
Furthermore, shareholders have an inherent interest in
avoiding price reductions triggered by a sudden large increase in
the supply of shares in the market that the shareholders themselves
might cause. The concern about lowering the price of the shares
in the midst of a sale may lead to self-restraint. Rational
shareholders, such as the sophisticated VCs that purchase shares
before the IPO, will therefore refrain from hastily flooding the
market with substantial amounts of shares, even in the absence of
any legal obligation.
In addition, it is foreseeable and natural that some increase in
the supply of the stock will occur following the IPO because old
investors are likely to realize profits by liquidating some of their
original investment, provided that there is no restriction at this
time. Since this is known at the time of the IPO, it should not
cause a significant effect on the stock price later. If the old
investors wish to conduct extensive sales, in an amount not
reasonably foreseen at the time of the IPO, the stock price should
reflect such conduct to the full extent, in the same manner as it
reflects any exogenous changes in the share supply. Artificially
delaying such sales, either by Rule 144 or by using underwriters’
lock-ups, however, does not seem to benefit the public, but rather
conceals important information from the public. Thus, if the
underwriters’ lock-ups are, in fact, driven by private dealing, and
efficiency requires that there will be no such contractual
restriction, Rule 144, which adds sale restrictions, is highly
inefficient and may serve questionable practices such as the IPO
under-pricing to the public’s detriment.

explanation for underpricing 15 percent or more in a fair system . . . . All local
tech IPOs this year have enjoyed first-day jumps of 25 percent or more.”); Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Banker’s Trial Gives Glimpse into Close Ties of Tech Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2003, at C1 (“[B]ankers often tried to attract new business by offering
corporate executives access to hot initial public offerings . . . .”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Rule 144, in its current form, is inefficient and has distorting
effects on the stock market and on the economy. Its negative
effects especially concern emerging ventures. Both the sellingvolume restriction and the holding-period restriction of Rule 144
impose a significant burden on companies. An increase in the cost
of raising capital and an incentive to invest in suboptimal levels are
two of the main problems caused by Rule 144’s restrictions.
In addition, the selling-volume restriction and the holdingperiod restriction fail to properly address the concerns that are at
the basis of Rule 144’s promulgation. The restrictions might even
cause the purchasing public to be less informed. Furthermore, the
restrictions do not effectively govern the trading volume increase,
and their contribution to market stabilization is limited at best.
Thus, I propose abolishing the main restrictions of Rule 144 and
allowing market forces to reach an efficient mechanism.
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